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Abstract:
The aim of the paper is to analyse the concept of legal instinct. Four proposals 
of understanding this phenomenon are assessed: as pre-understanding, as 
the capacity to recognize legal rules, as a kind of precognition about legal facts 
and as an inborn cognitive ability. This division allows not only to organize the 
discussion pertaining to this issue,  but also to indicate the conceptual connec-
tions between the concept of legal instinct and concepts in its direct vicinity, 
e.g. the concept of intuition. The considerations end with an outline of the role 
of instinct in legal cognition. 
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Streszczenie:
Celem artykułu jest analiza pojęcia instynktu prawniczego. Omówione zostały 
cztery propozycje rozumienia tego zjawiska: jako przedrozumienia, jako zdol-
ności rozpoznawania reguł prawnych, jako rodzaju przedwiedzy o faktach 
prawnych oraz jako wrodzonej zdolności poznawczej. Ów podział pozwala 
na uporządkowanie dyskusji dotyczącej tego zagadnienia, a także wskazanie 
związków pomiędzy pojęciem instynktu prawniczego oraz pojęć blisko z nim 
związanych, jak choćby pojęcia intuicji. Rozważania kończą się naszkicowa-
niem roli instynktu w poznaniu prawniczym.
Słowa kluczowe: 
instynkt prawniczy, intuicja prawnicza, poznanie prawnicze, rozumowanie 
prawnicze






For obvious reasons, I will not undertake a 
more in-depth reflection on the phenomenon 
of instinct. Commenting on about 150 years of 
discussion on this subject goes far beyond the 
scope of this study, as well as my competence. 
Instinct has been understood differently by bi-
ologists, ethnologists, and in yet another way 
– by psychologists, especially by proponents 
of evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, it has 
been conceptualized in a very different manner 
by neuroscientists. Encyclopedic definitions 
most often refer to instinct as a genetically 
conditioned (inborn and hereditary) capacity 
of animals and humans to perform certain ac-
tivities necessary for their survival. In turn, 
the ‘self-preservation instinct’ would mean an 
adaptive ability to survive of both individuals 
and the entire species. 
How should a legal instinct be understood in 
the face of all of this? Can one talk about in-
stinct at all in relation to legal knowledge? Cer-
tainly, legal knowledge has many specific fea-
tures that distinguish it from standard scientific 
knowledge. 
These differences also pertain to the issue of 
understanding of legal instinct. First and fore-
most, legal instinct is not present, as it is often 
assumed by biologists, at the same stage of 
development of all individuals, and not in all 
individuals, and its strength is usually variable 
among individuals[1]. 
From the point of view of general philosophy 
and legal philosophy, one more issue,,seems 
to be of significance, namely the relation be-
tween the concepts of instinct and legal intui-
tion. For some, they are two different cogni-
tive abilities, and for others – they refer to the 
same phenomenon. Proponents of the first 
position point to  different sources of cognitive 
dispositions, and the supporters of the other 
to the same role that instinct and intuition play 
in the process of legal cognition (legal inter-
pretation), being something that would be 
best described as ‘legal preknowledge.’[2]
I would like to discuss four different approach-
es to ‘legal instinct’: respectively, legal instinct 
as pre-apprehension, as the ability to recog-
nize legal rules, as a kind of preknowledge of 
legal facts and as an innate cognitive ability. 
The classification proposed here may raise 
some doubts. First of all, I am not sure if the 
classes mentioned are separable. Neverthe-
less, despite the fact that the boundaries be-
tween various instances of legal instinct seem 
to be blurred, I would like to defend the pro-
posed classification, since it allows us to say 
1It will depend on many factors, especially culture, legal tradition 
and education. 
2Stelmach, J. (2001) Die intuitiven Grundlagen der Jurisprudenz,
in: Umwelt, Wirtschaft und Recht, Hrsg. Bauer, H. , Czybulka, D.,
Kahl, W. ,  Vosskuhle, A. , Mohr Siebeck, p. 161 and n. 
Certainly, legal knowledge has many specific features that 
distinguish it from standard scientific knowledge. 
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more about both legal instinct and the many 
notions connected with it, especially legal in-
tuition, pre-apprehension or finally, legal pre-
knowledge.  
Legal instinct as pre-apprehension
The problem of pre-apprehension has been 
widely discussed in hermeneutics, both philo-
sophical and legal. Pre-apprehension (defined 
in the German literature mostly by two terms, 
namely Vorverständnis and Vorurteil) means 
the beginning, the Archimedean starting point 
for all cognitive processes of understanding. 
Here, it is necessary to recall that hermeneu-
tics was the philosophy of interpretation, for 
which the concept of understanding was cru-
cial. Pre-apprehension is preceded by a proper 
understanding process, which, according to 
Gadamer, whom I finally agree with, is syn-
onymous with interpretation and application[3]. 
Here, essential for further discussion will be to 
settle the issue  of whether pre-apprehension, 
and what follows – namely understanding, are 
interpreted as a kind of instinct or not. Herme-
neutics itself does not help in this task. This 
is a heterogeneous type of philosophy of in-
terpretation. Not only did there exist two dif-
ferent hermeneutical outlooks, methodological 
and ontological – within these outlooks, there 
were competing proposals of how to under-
stand interpretation. At first glance, it seems 
that hermeneutics has always had a strong an-
tinaturalistic stance, which would make it dif-
ficult to recognize pre-apprehension (or under-
standing itself) as a kind of cognitive instinct. 
It is an antinaturalistic philosophy, since, from 
3Gadamer, H. G. (1986)  Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge 
einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Gesammelte Werke, t. I, 
Tübingen, p. 312 and n.
the beginning, it has sought methods suitable 
for humanities, differentiating between un-
derstanding and scientific explanation. At the 
same time, within the methodological outlook, 
both in the thought of Scheleiermacher and 
Dilthey, the concepts of pre-apprehension and 
understanding were interpreted in psychologi-
cal terms, precisely as a kind of interpretative 
instinct. Schleiermacher discussed the con-
cept of a ‘better understanding’ (besser Ver-
stehen), and Dilthey the idea of understanding 
as ‘putting oneself into’ (Hineinversetzen) the 
position of the person whose work or behavior 
we interpret[4]. Pre-apprehension and under-
standing are essentially phenomena from the 
field of psychology. In other words, they are 
instinctive forms of direct cognition – that is, 
cognition not based on earlier assumptions. 
We understand simply because we have an 
interpretive instinct. However, we have a more 
difficult problem with phenomenologically-ori-
ented hermeneutics, which on the one hand is 
definitely anti-psychological, but on the other 
hand uses concepts that are also directly relat-
ed to instinct, such as Lebenswelt or Dasein[5]. 
Speaking of legal instinct as a pre-apprehen-
sion or understanding, we reach for certain 
conceptual categories, which have so far been 
reserved for legal hermeneutics. Does this not 
pose a threat of confusing certain concepts 
and phenomena? In my opinion it is not the 
case, because we have no universally accept-
ed definitions of these concepts. We refer at 
most to some primitive (archetypal) cognitive 
4Stelmach, J. Die hermeneutische Auffassung der 
Rechtsphilosophie, p. 23 and n.
5The notion of Lebenswelt was used by Husserl, and the notion 
of Dasein was used by Heidegger. Husserl, E. (1982) Medytacje 
kartezjańskie, Warszawa, p. 26; Heidegger, M. (1994) Bycie i 
czas, Warszawa, p. 73, 116, 176, 191, 237, 245.





ideas that some would define as intuition, and 
others, in turn, as instincts.
Legal instinct as the ability 
to recognize legal rules 
A ‘good lawyer’ should possess a certain abili-
ty to identify legal rules which, in consequence, 
allow him to correctly interpret the so-called 
difficult cases. This ability, in my opinion, is 
nothing more than a legal instinct. By using our 
pre-existing knowledge, practical experience, 
pre-apprehension, we are able to accomplish 
something essentially impossible, namely 
specify (indicate) a legal rule that we did not 
know existed before. According to Hart, we 
can do this because we have the ‘natural’ abil-
ity to recognize the rules and laws expressed 
by the ‘rule of recognition’. The rule of recogni-
tion exists because it is ‘genuinely accepted’, 
and when it is accepted by both individuals 
and officials and lawyers, it provides us, as 
a ‘final rule’, with authoritative criteria for the 
recognition of original rules of duty[6]. This rule 
is, for me, the ability to recognize legal rules 
that build on the actual knowledge of the law, 
and in essence, on preknowledge, on familiar-
ity with (understanding of) the environment in 
which the legal rules function. The operation of 
this rule is, in my opinion,  another confirmation 
of the existence of a legal instinct. I find en-
tering into disputes about other possible inter-
pretations of the rule of recognition purely aca-
demic. Hart himself, arguing in this regard with 
Kelsen, states that the problem of whether or 
not the rule of recognition exists and what its 
content are, i.e., what are the criteria for the va-
6Hart, H. L. A. (1998) Pojęcie prawa, Warszawa, p. 140 and n.; also 
Stelmach, J. (2001) The basic standard, in: Studies in the philosophy 
of law, Kraków, p. 67 and next.
lidity of a given system, is an empirical problem, 
however complex[7]. It is different in the case of 
Kelsen, for whom a ‘basic norm’ (Grundnorm) 
does not have any actual (empirical) justifica-
tion, and therefore, it is not very relevant to the 
notion of legal instinct. A basic norm can be 
interpreted as a kind of intuition, permitting the 
study of the a priori structures that are present 
in law, which Kelsen referred to as a norm that 
is ‘presupposed’, ‘fake’, ‘postulated’ or a ‘legal 
hypothesis’. Such understanding of the basic 
norm and many other key legal concepts is a 
consequence of Kelsen’s adoption of a strong 
version of the hypothesis pertaining to the du-
ality of being and duty, which is equivalent to 
advocating extreme legal antinaturalism.  
Legal instinct as preknowledge 
of “legal facts’ 
In this case, we are presented with an un-
equivocally naturalistic approach to legal in-
stinct. In this view, legal instinct can be inter-
preted in at least three different ways. First, 
biologically, as an primordial cognitive dispo-
sition. Second, psychologically, as a certain 
type of archetypal imaginations and emo-
tions. Finally, thirdly and philosophically, as 
the ability to formulate judgments about facts 
based on basic impressions[8]. The problem 
that arises for the philosophical interpreta-
tion of instinct concerns primarily the issue 
of the empirical preknowledge of facts. Can 
something like that even be discussed? To be 
able to give a positive answer to this ques-
7Hart, H. L. A. The concept of law, p. 387–388. In another place (p. 
353), Hart says that the statement that the rule of recognition exists 
can only be external and factual. 
8Rudolf Carnap referred to this type of judgment as ‘protocol 
statements’.
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tion, we must either adopt a nativist point of 
view, reaching for biological arguments, or 
go in the direction of Kant and his concep-
tion of synthetic judgments a priori, which, 
although they are empirical judgments, do 
not have to be based on prior experience. It 
is difficult, however, to recognize Kant’s con-
ception as naturalistic, although, as may be 
worth noting, such attempts have also been 
made. So, if we assume that the naturalis-
tic interpretation of instinct as preknowledge 
of facts is possible, then one more doubt 
remains to be clarified, namely, the under-
standing of a legal fact. There are two dif-
ferent interpretations that may be taken into 
consideration. According to the first, a legal 
fact is something empirical. This extremely 
naturalistic, monistic approach gives rise to 
further controversies, the main of them re-
lated to the so-called naturalistic fallacy. The 
second interpretation draws attention to the 
peculiarity  of the legal fact, given its nor-
mative sense and meaning. Here, in turn, the 
basic objection boils down to the so-called 
antinaturalistic fallacy[9]. 
Despite these doubts, I am convinced that it is 
reasonable to talk about legal intuition as a kind 
9The ‘Naturalistic’ and ‘Antinaturalistic’ fallacies are discussed in 
the book by Brożek, A. , Brożek, B., Stelmach, J. (2013) Fenomen 
normatywności, Kraków, passim.
of preknowledge of legal facts. How otherwise 
otherwise would we explain the problem of le-
gal preknowledge? As certain dispositions and 
interpretative abilities of the majority of mem-
bers of a society (I would like to emphasize that 
this does not only concern lawyers) which are 
not based on prior systematized knowledge 
of the law? So, through what else, if not in-
stinct – though some may of course say that 
through intuition – can legal ‘self-knowledge’ 
(preknowledge) be explained? 
Legal instinct as an innate 
cognitive ability
Here, we also deal with a version of the natu-
ralistic interpretation of instinct, perhaps  most 
closely connected to the  neuroscientific ap-
proach . There are many obvious similarities 
between this approach and the previous one. 
The difference, however, is that in the present 
case, we limit ourselves to only one concept 
of instinct, namely the one that speaks of in-
stinct as an innate disposition correlated with 
the activity of the human brain. According 
to eminent representatives of neuroscience, 
Hanna and Antonio Damasio, there is no basis 
for opposing emotion to reason; there is no 
separate reason, because reason is embod-
ied. The psychophysical problem is a funda-
mental fundamental problem within  philoso-
phy and psychology – that is, the problem of 
Instinct seems to provide some necessary ‘adaptive mini-
mum’ for the survival of the individual in the world of law, 
including those individuals who, as I have already pointed 
out several times, are not legal professionals. 





the relation between the soul (reason) and the 
body – becomes solvable with the accept-
ance of Damasio’s theory. Antonio Damasio 
also speaks about how to understand the 
very concept of instinct. In his opinion, urges 
and instincts are controlled by innate neu-
ral circuits[10]. The idea of ‘embodied reason’ 
which he adopts causes that the standard ob-
jections that are formulated against the nativ-
ist conception of cognition lose their cogency. 
Of course, I cannot say anything meaningful 
about ‘innate neural circuits,’ but I am sure we 
have knowledge of phenomena and facts that 
we have never dealt with before. Although 
they were not the subject of prior cognition, 
we can predict, explain and interpret them. 
This also applies to ‘legal self-knowledge’, 
possessed by at least some individuals, not 
only lawyers – which I have already mentioned 
before, when writing about legal instinct as 
preknowledge of legal facts. It is difficult, 
therefore, not to associate this kind of ability 
with the notion of legal instinct. 
Eventually, it is not a question about the ex-
istence of instinct, as well as legal instinct, 
which is the subject of controversy, but the 
problem of the origin of that cognitive ability. 
Should we consider it as an innate ability, a 
disposition connected with workings of the 
brain, or rather as something that is shaped 
by ‘external experience’, the whole empirical 
context, knowledge, background, education, 
culture, and cognitive habits? There is also a 
third possibility according to which  both of 
these sources are equally important to explain 
legal instinct[11].  
10Damasio, H., Damasio, A. (1989) Lesion Analysis in 
Neuropsychology, Oxford University Press ; Damasio, A. (1999) 
Błąd Kartezjusza, Poznań. 
11Which would be in compatible with Hanna and Antonio 
The role of instinct in legal 
cognition
Instinct seems to provide some necessary 
‘adaptive minimum’ for the survival of the in-
dividual in the world of law, including those 
individuals who, as I have already pointed out 
several times, are not legal professionals. This 
is a cognitive disposition that allows us to build 
a certain ‘image of law’. Ultimately, whether 
someone will claim that there is a legal intuition, 
or an instinct, will not really matter so much be-
cause their role in the practice of interpretation 
is ultimately the same. It will always be about 
a certain type of direct cognition, regardless 
of whether we use the notion of intuition or in-
stinct. The rest is only a consequence of previ-
ously accepted philosophical assumptions. If 
one prefers the analytical approaches and thus 
reflects on the  phenomenon of conceptual or 
phenomenological cognition and the concept 
of a priori knowledge, he will prefer to use the 
notion of intuition to define any direct cognitive 
acts. In turn, the proponent of a more natural-
istic vision of law, in the context of ontology as 
well as epistemology and axiology of law, will 
most likely use the notion of instinct to discuss 
the direct types of legal cognition. And this 
might be where the problem lies; I refer here to 
the endless disputes and academic debates. 
If we base our positions on different philo-
sophical assumptions, we accept different on-
tologies, and as a consequence, also different 
epistemologies and axiology of law, we are not 
able to communicate, because we are simply 
talking about different things.
Damasio’s conception, according to which it is not reasonable to 
oppose reason and emotions.  
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